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wrongly by willfully failing to learn Esperanto. And it’s an intuition that
springs up in response not to some bizarre thought experiment, but in
response to a situation that I am in fact in; I have just navigated away
from the webpage that would have given me access to the free classes and
I don’t intend to return to it. Given that we don’t actually live in a world
of saints, shouldn’t we behave differently from the way that we should
behave if we did? Aren’t we at least permitted to behave differently? It
seems to me that we should and that we are so permitted; it seems to me
that according to the Triple Theory, we should not and are not. And thus
the Triple Theory seems wrong to me.
On What Matters is a closely-argued and detailed investigation of some
of the main metaethical issues (there are notable absences: discussion of
God and free will is rather brisk) and of the commonalities between three
great traditions of normative theory: Kantianism, Consequentialism, and
Contractualism. I hazard that nobody will agree with it in its entirety, but
anyone with interests in any of the topics on which it dwells will find
much of value in it and that it amply rewards what it demands: careful
reading and re-reading.

In Adam’s Fall: A Meditation on the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin, by Ian
A. McFarland. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. 256 pages. $120 (hardcover).
Matthew Barrett, California Baptist University
Few doctrines are as difficult and controversial as the doctrine of original
sin. To the modern thinker, the doctrine of original sin is absurd. How can
one person’s sin eons and eons ago determine the status and nature of all
humanity? But when we open the pages of Scripture, we quickly see that
the doctrine of original sin is a biblical doctrine, taught by the apostle Paul
himself. Therefore, it is safe to say that the doctrine of original sin is a
Christian belief. Where controversy arises, however, is in exactly how we,
as Christians, should define original sin.
Ian McFarland has sought to tackle this very issue, though from a more
philosophical and historical perspective. His thesis is straightforward and
ambitious:
In reaction to a wide range of criticisms leveled against the idea of original
sin, a number of Christian theologians in the modern period have attempted to develop a doctrine of sin in which the idea of original sin is heavily
qualified or even rejected. Against these perspectives, I will argue that it is
not only theologically defensible, but inseparable from the confession of
Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord. Indeed, I will defend the doctrine in what
is arguably its most extreme form, as developed by Augustine and later
defended in the Reformed theological tradition under the designation of
“total depravity”—the claim that no aspect of our humanity is untouched
by sin. (x)
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McFarland, no doubt, is swimming upstream since many (most?) modern theologians reject original sin outright. However, do not be fooled.
McFarland does not simply restate earlier positions, but seeks to address
modern questions that earlier generations did not have to answer.
In many ways, McFarland’s goal is accomplished. Throughout the book
he has several strong statements affirming “total depravity.” Furthermore,
McFarland challenges the popular assumption that free will must be defined as the power of self-determination. He does so utilizing not only
Augustine (chapter 3) but also Maximus the Confessor (chapter 4), a figure who (unlike Augustine) has flown under the radar of much contemporary scholarship on the topic of whether God, rather than the will, “is the
source of individual identity, since it is God whose call defines the good
for a person” (xi). I applaud McFarland for resisting what seems to be the
modern assumption, namely, that if the will is to be free, it must be selfdetermined, libertarian, and contra-causal in nature. McFarland believes
a libertarian view to be so problematic that it is found to “betray the good
news of Jesus Christ, which is that we have been chosen and not that we
have done the choosing” (xii). He clarifies, “This is not to deny that we
quite obviously do choose all manner of things, still less to suggest that
our relationship to God in Christ is anything other than free; but it is to
insist that while we love God—and thereby are most truly and properly
human—freely, that love, like all love, is, in its joy and freedom, beyond
our capacity to choose” (xii).
Despite these strengths (and many others unmentioned), there is reason
to believe that McFarland is inconsistent in applying his thesis. As cited
above, McFarland’s intention is to defend the Christian doctrine of original
sin by arguing that it is defensible theologically and inseparable from the
confession of the gospel. So far so good. But then McFarland states that he
will defend it in its most extreme form, as developed by Augustine and
later defended in the “Reformed theological tradition under the designation of ‘total depravity.’” Here is where the confusion begins.
In the Reformed tradition original sin not only includes original corruption (sometimes called pollution) from where we get the doctrine of
total depravity, but original guilt as well. Furthermore, it is from original
guilt that original corruption is birthed. Therefore, Adam’s progeny inherit both a guilty status from Adam and a corrupt nature. However, not
only does McFarland overlook both aspects (guilt and corruption) in his
thesis, but the rest of his book demonstrates that he rejects the Reformed
doctrine of original guilt entirely. For example, McFarland argues that if
it is the case that “we sin because we are sinners”—the classic Reformed
view—“the conclusion seems unavoidable that our sinful state is finally
God’s responsibility as the one who made us that way” (148). Later on,
McFarland rejects both the realist and federalist views that affirm original guilt. Picking on the federal view he writes, “there is no reason why
Adam’s being the first in a series should justify his representing the rest
of the series in God’s sight.” God is made arbitrary, says McFarland, if
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Adam is made our representative by whom we are counted guilty in his
sin. Therefore, in light of these statements, it appears that McFarland’s
thesis fails on two accounts: (1) Original sin in “its most extreme form”
(as represented by Augustine and the Reformed) does not merely include
total depravity but the imputation of guilt. McFarland fails to recognize
this in his thesis. (2) McFarland does not actually defend original sin in
“its most extreme form, as developed by Augustine” and the “Reformed
tradition,” but actually rejects the imputation of guilt.
But more to the point still, McFarland has missed crucial arguments
the Reformed make out of texts like Romans 5. A full defense cannot be
made here (e.g., see works by John Murray), but a few points deserve
mention. (1) In Romans 5 there is a clear parallel and contrast between
Adam and Christ, one that is so strong it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Adam and Christ act as representatives (also see 1 Cor. 15:45–49).
(2) When Paul says in Rom. 5:12, “because all sinned,” he is referring to
Adam as our representative so that a reference to actual sins is precluded.
Instead, Paul is arguing that it was through Adam’s sin that “all sinned.”
(3) The reason death reins even when there was no law (before Moses; cf.
5:12–14) is because on the basis of Adam’s sin all men who came thereafter
were counted as guilty before God. (4) In Rom. 5:16–19 the imputation of
guilt is inferred since Paul asserts that because of Adam’s trespass, all men
are condemned before God. Paul then compares condemnation in Adam
with justification in Christ. Clearly, forensic categories are in view. (5) If it
is unfair for Adam’s guilt to be imputed to his progeny, then must we not
also cry “unfair!” to Christ’s righteousness being imputed to us for our
justification? Yet, this is the parallel Paul makes.
In the end, McFarland’s solution is difficult to make sense of. Original
sin exists not because “we all somehow pre-exist in Adam (as in realism), or because God has predetermined that Adam will stand for the
whole human race (as in federalism), but simply because we are all one
with Adam, and thus that we share with him—and with each other—the
same nature, marked by the damaged wills that turn us all invariably and
catastrophically away from God” (160). But what does this mean? How is
being one “with” Adam different from being one “in” Adam? And how
can McFarland say we are one “with Adam” because “we share with him
. . . the same nature”? It is hard to see how McFarland avoids borrowing
realist language. Again, I applaud McFarland for his affirmation of our
pervasive corruption, but his explanation for how corruption is actually
passed on is ambiguous and his rejection of imputed guilt struggles to
make sense of texts like Romans 5 where representation language seems
obvious.
Finally, McFarland argues that Christ himself assumes a fallen human
nature in the incarnation, also meaning that Christ possesses a fallen
human will and mind. He argues that such was necessary for Christ to become like us in every way (Heb. 2:17–18). He also believes he is taking the
fathers and creeds (e.g., Chalcedon) to their logical end, for what Christ
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has not assumed he cannot redeem. However, there are serious concerns
with such a novel proposal. First, It does not follow that Christ must assume a fallen human nature, but only a human nature to truly be human
like us. Sin is accidental to man’s nature, meaning Adam was not created
sinful but became a sinner. Therefore, in order to be 100 percent human,
Christ need only assume a human nature, not a fallen nature. Second,
McFarland again ignores the representation language found throughout
Scripture. The reason Jesus is able to atone for us is because he, as the
God-man, acts as our representative before the Father (Rom. 5:15–21).
His intercession, therefore, is not contingent on possessing a fallen human
nature, an idea foreign to Scripture. Third, it is incomprehensible to see
how Christ avoids being a sinner, condemned before the Father, if he assumes our fallen human nature. Before we do anything good or bad, we
come into this world inheriting a corrupt nature from Adam. Therefore,
we stand guilty before God as those who possess a fallen nature. We are
truly sinful in God’s sight and therefore culpable. So if we are condemned
for our fallenness, is not Christ also? How then can Christ be said to be
blameless not only in deed but in his person? It simply will not do to argue
(as McFarland does) that Christ’s sinlessness is a function of his hypostasis
and not of his human nature, for the two cannot be divorced from one
another as the latter impacts and, in part, defines the former. How can a
fallen human nature not result in a fallen person? Does the divine compensate for the human, and if so have we not succumbed to Eutychianism?
Fourth, McFarland wrongly argues that Christ can assume a fallen human
nature since our sinful nature, though fallen, “remains good and not evil.”
“However badly damaged it may be, our nature never separates us from
God” (129). Such a statement is not Reformed but Semi-Pelagian. To the
contrary, it is precisely because we have a fallen nature that we are unacceptable before God (Ps. 51:5). And possessing a fallen nature does indeed
create a massive relational breach between us and God (Eph. 2:1–5). Yes,
God may continue to uphold the existence of our nature, but that in no
way means he is in approval of our nature as fallen. The same, therefore,
applies to Christ should he assume a fallen human nature.
To conclude, McFarland boldly takes on the challenges posed to the
doctrine of original sin, and to his credit he seeks to answer questions previous generations of theologians did not have to. Nevertheless, his thesis is
inconsistent and his solution to the puzzle of original sin remains unsatisfying. Going forward, theologians must address the questions McFarland
seeks to answer, though in my opinion with a different solution.

